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The Subject of Abolitionist Rhetoric: 
Freedom and Trauma 
in The Life ofOlaudah Equiano 
Ide Corley1 
By means of signifiers, language performs the plenitude once experienced 
but now inaccessible to consciousness. 
Claudia Tate 
Introduction: A Critical Impasse 
The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano, or Gustavus Vasa, the Af- 
rican (1789) includes an account of the abduction and transportation from West 
Africa to the Americas of a former slave "written by himself." As a unique historical 
artifact of the abolition movement, the autobiography continues to garner consid- 
erable critical attention. But, despite the self-authenticating tactics of the subtitle, 
an apparent split in the narrative voice raises questions of authorial intention and 
control. Critics have answered these by celebrating the text's disruption of Western 
modes of thinking, of binary distinctions between epistemological categories such 
as black and white, or civilization and savagery. Yet nascent aspirations to represent 
Equiano as a visionary or as a redemptive figure of modernity are prohibited by his 
apparent acquiescence to Enlightenment reason and the principles of free trade, 
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his submission to the judicial processes of the early capitalist state and his evangel- 
ical impulses. Subsequently, the question posed by Wilfred D. Samuel's in 1985- 
"What, in the final analysis, did Equiano intend?" (66)-continues to preoccupy 
critics. It was most recently foregrounded by Katalin Orban in 1993: "The problem 
is one of authorial intention," Orban asserts; is the over-arching "enlightened" dis- 
course of the text "to be taken at face value," he asks, "or is it just a cover for smug- 
gling dangerous ideas into the heads of unsympathetic readers?" (657). 
Within this interrogative frame, the semantic possibilities of the autobiography 
are somewhat constrained. In particular, authorial expressions of equivocation are 
hastily smuggled out of the text by Equiano's critics. Critical readings frequently 
aim to erase ambiguities or to collapse narrative contradictions into a singular line 
of reasoning. In order to preempt the potential accusation that Equiano was a self- 
serving capitalist preparing the ground for mercantile colonialism, a critical drive 
to rescue him is undertaken. Several critics, in an apologetic mode, urge the reader 
to accept the supposed necessities of the text's historical production. Joseph Fich- 
telberg, reading the persona of the author as the epitome of the principle of ex- 
change, explains that an accomodationist solution was the only one historically 
available. Citing Equiano's views on the potential expansion of European trade 
with Africa, Fichtelberg acknowledges that Equiano's language "suggest[s] the 
worst kind of exploitation" (475). But he reserves judgment. "Whether Equiano in- 
tended such severity is beside the point," Fichtelberg asserts, because "the dis- 
course he adopted demanded it" (475). In a similar manner, Chinosole insists that 
a certain amount of "mental colonization" (50) must necessarily have taken place 
in order to bring about the conditions whereby Equiano could write to begin with. 
Alternatively, critics who oppose the apologetic argument say that Equiano re- 
sorts to strategies of subversion in his writing. They point to the deployment of 
narrative devices that undercut the foundational assumptions of Enlightenment 
discourse in relation to "blackness." Beneath the disguise of the literate European, 
Wilfred D. Samuels argues, lies Equiano's hidden self-characterization as a "tradi- 
tional African man" (67) or a "great traditional warrior and title bearer" (67). For 
Samuels, the text instigates a return to an idealized Eboe identity, after Equiano's 
cultural dispossession by European slavers.2 While also emphasizing subversive 
narrative technique, Marion Rust draws the opposite conclusion. She claims that 
the use of irony destabilizes ideal identities produced by Western discourse. At log- 
gerheads with Samuels, her reading highlights the autobiography's formulations of 
2 The relative accuracy of Equiano's comments on Eboe values and customs is debated. 
Ogude first problematized references to Eboe culture in the Life by arguing that Equiano, 
as a child, could not have known about some of the things he describes, including, for ex- 
ample, the details of initiation ceremonies. For the most recent discussion of Equiano's 
Eboe cultural legacy, see Sabino and Hall. 
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syncretic culture and hybrid identity. Although Rust celebrates the fact that "the 
text itself is a rupture" (35), she eventually reproduces the apologetic case with the 
assertion that "it is only by becoming a successful trader" (35) that Equiano can fi- 
nally articulate his "dissatisfaction" (35) with European interventions in Africa. 
Within this critical quagmire, I find it troublesome that the political dynamics 
of Equiano's evaluation in relation to his readers remain a mute point. In spite of 
worlds of disparity between the author and the reader, the reader is positioned as 
intellectually and ethically knowing. While critics underestimate Equiano's imme- 
diate experience of slavery and political activism, they presume that the reader 
knows the effects of slavery, of racism, of mercantile colonialism and of missionary 
projects on eighteenth century Africans better than he. This assumption leads to 
the problematic portrait of Equiano as victim, either of racism or circumstance. 
When readers are asked to focus on the irretrievable intentions of the author, the 
figurative achievement of Equiano's writing is diminished; its self-authenticating 
gestures are disappointingly neglected. 
Desire and the Protocols of Race in Equiano's Autobiography 
In her interesting book, Psychoanalysis and Black Novels: Desire and the Protocols of 
Race, Claudia Tate delineates a way of reading black novels that can help to dissolve 
this critical impasse and, perhaps, to open the criticism of Equiano's autobiogra- 
phy to different kinds of readings. Tate adapts a model of textual subjectivity pro- 
posed by Peter Brooks in order to demonstrate how the black modernist canon was 
shaped. Starting from the Lacanian assertion that the psyche is structured like a 
language, Tate examines novelistic structure in terms of conscious and uncon- 
scious discourses. She adopts the term "conscious discourse" to describe "the ex- 
plicit social content" of a novel "recorded, for example in the plot, incidents, char- 
acterization, and dialogue" (26). In order to be included within the canon of black 
modernism, she contends, a novel was expected to furnish a conscious discourse 
of racial and social protest. 
For Tate, however, "unconscious discourses" in black novels frequently disrupt 
a text's conscious adoption of a political stance. She describes "unconscious dis- 
course" as "a puzzling rhetorical performance that generates meaning in the novel 
that is external to its racial/social argument" (13). Unconscious discourses, con- 
tained in narrative elements such as "repetition, exaggeration, ellipsis, suspension, 
anticipation, digression, irony, coincidence" (32), prohibit an overt political read- 
ing and give rise to what Tate calls "surplus meaning" (9). She maintains that in- 
terpretative problems brought about by the dissonance of "public collective 
protocols of race" (13) and "private, individual desire" (13) often account for the 
marginalization of certain books, even those written by prominent, influential au- 
thors such as W.E.B. Du Bois or Richard Wright. When the excessive signing of sur- 
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plus meaning disrupts a novel's articulation of racial and social protest, its 
aesthetic integrity appears to be compromised. 
But even though it is replete with textual enigmas, Equiano's autobiography 
cannot conceivably be marginalized within the canon of slave narratives. Critics of 
the text who also frame expectations of racial and social protest are often disap- 
pointed by the complex assertions of selfhood that are articulated there. My ap- 
proach is to move beyond the search for submerged intentions to illuminate the 
ways in which surplus meaning arises in The Life ofOlaudah Equiano as a response 
to the contradictory construction of black subjectivity within abolitionist rhetoric. 
For, in the face of a pro-slavery movement, abolitionist rhetoric aims to erect a co- 
herent and reliable slave-subject as the necessary object of political desire. Narra- 
tive contingencies that might be evoked by the irregular effects of memory or the 
aporias of desire are briefly countenanced but never explored. Instead, reflections 
on identity are meticulously checked in favor of the stock scenes and tropes of the 
speaking subject. As it advances an important argument against slavery, The Life of 
Olaudah Equiano produces a conscious and apparently volitional discourse of 
black subjectivity. It contains within that discourse an image of "enlightened" 
blackness. But the attempt to speak from a stable political position despite the lack 
of institutional support produces enigmatic textual postures. Passages that disaf- 
filiate the voice of the speaking subject from its "enlightenment" assertions set the 
text awash. The self-image is exposed as a Lacanian imago, allowing for the in- 
scription of "misrecognition"3 in the autobiography. Equiano's narrative simulta- 
neously complies with the abolitionist demand and exposes its contradictory, 
traumatic subtext. 
This paper examines the Life of Olaudah Equiano as a site where a theory of 
subjectivity is enacted. First, I will explore the means by which the text generates a 
conscious discourse of "enlightened" blackness. Then, I will show how narrative 
elements yield an unconscious discourse that necessarily weakens the evolution of 
the text's conscious goals. Following the recent trend in psychoanalytic criticism 
by authors such as Claudia Tate, Judith Butler, Barbara Johnson and Hortense 
Spillers, I aim to reveal the means by which the Life enacts a theory of the subject 
within a nexus of social and psychic effects of power;4 by mediating the image of 
the "enlightened" black subject with the structural arrangement of textual ele- 
3 In "The Mirror Stage," Lacan proposes that consciousness, or the linguisticated "self," is 
precipitated when an infant first examines his(her) reflection in a mirror. The infant's 
self-identification is a described by Lacan as a form of "misrecognition;" the "self" iden- 
tified is only an "imago" (735). While the child receives an image of totality from his per- 
ception of his image in the mirror, this act of perception also functions to negate the 
"self" by generating an imaginary identification with something outside of it. For Lacan, 
selfhood is irreducibly fictional. 
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ments, Equiano's autobiography disarticulates the Enlightenment synthesis be- 
tween social and psychic processes and questions the idea of the reasoning subject. 
Self Mastery and the Subject Presumed to Know 
Equiano's autobiography is divided thematically into two sections coinciding with 
its first publication in two volumes in 1789. Volume one, chapters one to seven, re- 
counts the author's personal experience of slavery culminating in his purchase of 
freedom. Volume two, chapters eight to twelve, deals with successive intense crises 
of conscience on the part of the author, eventually resolved in his conversion to the 
Church of England. The emergence of the conversion narrative in the second vol- 
ume of the text provides one locus of the intense debate among critics regarding 
the author's sincerity. For many readers, the task of reconciling the persona of 
"Equiano, the entrepeneur" with "Equiano, the Christian convert" seems impossi- 
ble. Yet this dissonance is key to understanding the texts puzzling production of the 
"enlightened" black subject. Specifically, a sequence of doubling events in the 
shape of storms and dreams forms an interlocking narrative structure between the 
two volumes that provides a key to the text's unconscious discourse. 
In Scenes of Subjection (1997), Saidiya Hartman provides a critical insight that 
allows us to read the two volumes as a diptych, articulating parallel and mutually 
reinforcing themes in relation to the autobiographical subject. Hartman addresses 
modern uses of terror, shifting the focus from grotesque scenes of human violation 
to the issue of civil rights. The analysis of anti-bellum violence, she maintains, 
tends towards a re-enactment of the slave's objectification. The question of terror 
is re-shaped: "[S]uppose that the recognition of human suffering held out the 
prospect not of liberating the flesh or redeeming one's suffering but rather of in- 
tensifying it?" (5). She pursues the inquiry by examining "the ways in which the 
recognition of humanity and individuality acted to tether, bind and oppress" (5) 
during slavery and its aftermath. 
Although Hartman works with texts written considerably later than Equiano's 
and within a geographic context that Equiano's text supersedes, her observations 
on the social condition of the freedman seem to bear relevance to his writing. 
Hartman maintains that, after Emancipation in the Southern states, the slaver- 
4 In her work, Spillers brings the critical theory of African-American identity to bear on 
psychoanalysis. Her writing begins a process that aims "to historicize the psychoanalytic 
object and objective, invade its hereditary premises and insulations, and open its insights 
to cultural and social forms that are disjunctive to its originary imperatives" (135). Both 
Johnson (1992) and Butler apply psychoanalytic theory to Nella Larsen's fiction. They 
make similar arguments about the ways in which black textuality demonstrates that 
structures of racial identification for the individual also inform and are in turn shaped by 
social and political structures. 
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holder's whip was replaced by a burden of conscience imposed on the freed popu- 
lation: "The free(d) individual was nothing if not burdened, responsible and 
obligated" (125), she claims. Her analysis of self-help manuals produced by white 
authors for former slaves enables her to expose the management of language that 
worked to replace external modes of coercive subjection with internal modes of 
ideological submission. She convincingly shows that a new ideology of blackness 
was advanced in order to cultivate a population of acquisitive, servile and self-re- 
liant individuals: "The very bestowal of freedom established the indebtedness of 
the freed through a calculus of blame and responsibility that mandated that the 
formerly enslaved both repay this investment of faith and prove their worthiness" 
(125). 
In his autobiography, Equiano appears to respond to ideological pressures sim- 
ilar to those described by Hartman. After he purchases his freedom, he communi- 
cates a sense of indebtedness and appreciation. Indeed, he shows how an attitude 
of subservience sometimes threatens to overwhelm him; it is most apparent in a 
passage that implicitly conflates his "master," Robert King, with "God": 
These words of my master were like a voice from heaven to me; in an instant all 
my trepidation was turned into unutterable bliss; and I most reverently bowed 
myself with gratitude, unable to express my feelings, but by the overflowing of my 
eyes, and a heart replete with thanks to God; while my true and worthy friend the 
captain congratulated us both with a peculiar degree of heartfelt pleasure. (137) 
Also, while Equiano's describes his response as thankfulness ("I most reverently 
bowed myself with gratitude"), in the presence of his former master, gratitude 
alone is not adequate. In the passage, Equiano seems deliberately to place himself 
at a precarious distance from the Enlightenment model of reasoning man perhaps 
typified by Robert King. He describes himself as "unable" (137) to portray his emo- 
tions with words, crying, and unsure of his behavior. In the next sentence, he says 
that he comported himself "in the best manner [he] was able" (137). As the scene 
closes, the freed Equiano continues to comport himself in an attitude of submis- 
sion. His first movement upon being freed is presented as an act of obedience and 
compliance: "I rose with heart full of affection and reverence, and left the room in 
order to obey my master's joyful mandate of going to the Register Office" (136). Al- 
though Equiano's urgent execution of his master's word is ironic, even after he ac- 
quires the certificate of manumission, his compliant demeanor does not change. 
Despite his wish to return to London, he still agrees to work on another voyage 
from Montserrat to Georgia on behalf of King; the reason he provides is that "grat- 
itude bowed [him] down" (138). When that voyage is complete, he once more con- 
cedes to yet another similar venture-"I found myself unable to refuse [King's] re- 
quests" (147), he tells. The language of obligation seems worryingly to fail Equiano 
and to retard his movement towards equal status with King. 
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Yet, as the conversion narrative progresses, the elevation of King to a transcen- 
dental position with respect to the "free" Equiano has more complex effects. Even 
though Equiano seems to shower King with unworldly devotion (corroborating 
Hartman's claim that the freed slave was obliged to "repay an investment of faith"), 
this same language prepares the ground for the eventual process whereby Equiano 
replaces King with "God" as Master, or in Lacanian terms as the Subject Presumed 
to Know (sujet suppose savoir). In The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis 
(1977), Lacan portrays the Subject Presumed to Know as a semantic entity capable 
of "full speech." The phrase "full speech" describes an imaginary linguistic action 
through which image and presence would coincide, obliterating the function of 
difference inaugurated by the symbol. Lacan proposes that a subject is interpolated 
as image into the symbolic order because of its attraction to the signifying lure of 
another image. The other image, with the semblance of a subject who "knows" ap- 
pears to validate the fantasy of self-presence in language. But the signifying action 
of the Subject Presumed to Know is always a masquerade. Instead, that subject 
constitutes no more than one of a number of unstable signs divided between a nar- 
rating "I" and a narrated "I." Even so, the pre-linguisticated "self" cannot resist the 
fantasy of "full speech" and enters language. The lack of selfsameness within lan- 
guage brings about a metonymic slide whereby the new subject substitutes other 
signs in the place of the Subject Presumed to Know always hoping to re-constitute 
the imaginary plenitude of its pre-linguisticated "self."5 
In slave law, the slave is constituted as "object" rather than as "subject" of lan- 
guage but manumission undoes this syntactical position. It opens the possibility 
for the reconstitution of the slave as subject through the acquisition of the rights 
of personhood; for this reason, Equiano adopts the legal parameters of selfhood 
towards an imaginary performance of self mastery. Through his part in Equiano's 
manumission, King fulfills the function of the Subject Presumed to Know, initiat- 
ing Equiano's entry as subject into the law. But the moment of manumission is not 
the same moment at which Equiano acquires language. After all, Equiano narrates 
a prior self in his account of his childhood in West Africa. Also, the obvious recog- 
nition of his humanity by slaveholders such as King and Pascal had already 
equipped Equiano with a language of self within a Western model, albeit an abject- 
ed one. Perhaps, this is why the moment of manumission seems to require Equi- 
ano's sense of obligation towards King in his performance of the Subject Presumed 
to Know. Still, Equiano manipulates the conventions of the conversion narrative in 
order to redirect this burden of obligation towards "God." In the first section of his 
autobiography, he acquires the capacity to perform the function of the legal sub- 
5 See Lacan, Fundamental, 232-45. Alan Sheridan translates Lacan's "sujet suppose savoir" 
as "subject who is supposed to know", but here I preferred to adopt Slavoj Zizek's trans- 
lation of the phrase as "Subject Presumed to Know" from The Sublime Object of Ideology. 
145 
The Subject of Abolitionist Rhetoric 
ject by purchasing his freedom for seventy pounds. By means of the conversion 
narrative, Equiano sanctifies his performance of legal subjectivity according to an 
Enlightenment model of "full speech." 
Certainly, Equiano deploys the conversion narrative to counter racist discourse 
that aims to endorse white supremacy on the basis of biology. By describing his 
adoption of Christianity, Equiano aims to extend the principles of Enlightenment 
to include black subjects. Earlier, in the first volume of the autobiography, Equiano 
also comments on the similarities between Eboe and Jewish traditions, referring 
his readers to T. Clarkson's "Essay on the Slavery and Commerce of the Human 
Species" especially to the point where Clarkson cites John Mitchel's "Causes of the 
Different Colours of Persons in Different Climates."6 Drawing on the assertions of 
Clarkson and Mitchel, Equiano further contends that differences in skin color sig- 
nify differences in climatic environment rather than intellectual inferiority or su- 
periority. For instance, in the case of a Portuguese settlement at Mitomba river in 
Sierra Leone, he shows that "the complexions of the same persons vary in different 
climates" and remarks "Surely the minds of the Spaniards did not change with 
their complexions!" (45). Ultimately, he adopts a culturalist position to explain ob- 
served differences in behavior between slaves and their holders. Equiano ascribes 
"the apparent inferiority" (45) of slaves discerned by Europeans to their cultural 
dislocation: "When [the slaves] come among Europeans, they are ignorant of their 
language, religion, manners, and customs" (45). More importantly, he describes 
numerous heinous acts of torture committed by slavers against their slaves as evi- 
dence of the dehumanizing goals of the institution. In addition, he compares the 
material conditions of some Africans to those of the ancestors of supposedly "en- 
lightened" Europeans: "Did Nature make [the ancestors] inferior to their sons? 
and should they too have been made slaves?" he sardonically poses, and replies 
that: "Every rational mind answers, No" (45). By demonstrating that "understand- 
ing is not confined to feature or colour" (45), Equiano strives to prove that under- 
standing rather than color is the path to dignity, where "understanding" is 
constituted as a Western model of knowing. 
Yet, as a principle of the conscious discourse of the Life, the term "understand- 
ing" finally connotes something that exceeds cultural literacy; when the word 
emerges in the conversion narrative, it is imbued with overtones of "faith." In Laca- 
nian terms, the Christian idea of "faith" might be described as an imaginary system 
under which the image of self can be brought into being, or full presence, through 
6 See Equiano 44. Caretta suggests that Mitchel's analysis of "race" influenced Equiano 
considerably. He quotes Mitchel's paper presented at the meeting of the Royal Society 
from 3 May to 14 June 1744. It states that people of different races "might very naturally be 
both descended from one and the same parents, as we are otherwise better assured from 
Scripture, that they are" (247). 
146 
Ide Corley 
language. The language that becomes central to Equiano's discourse of "under- 
standing" is, of course, Biblical language. Significantly, his conversion to Chris- 
tianity finally comes about as the result of an acquired "understanding" of the Bible 
rather than an acquired belief in "God." Equiano is reading "the fourth chapter of 
the Acts, twelfth verse" (189) when he experiences a vision. He describes the vision 
curiously by means of another Biblical verse: "the Lord was pleased to break in 
upon my soul with his bright beams of heavenly light; and in an instant, as it were, 
removing the veil, and letting light into a dark place" (9go). Since the vision is not 
a personal one, Equiano's repetition of these lines from the Book of Isaiah suggests 
that he has been "enlightened" by a union with full-speaking symbols or "the 
Word."7 It is only after Equiano has the vision that he becomes "willing to be 
saved" (9go). In the conscious discourse of the autobiography, his acquired "under- 
standing" of the Bible appears to make him present to his freedom. Simultaneous- 
ly, his conversion replaces the burden of obligation to his former master with a 
burden of obligation to "God"; a debit transfer takes place as Equiano "sees" what 
"a great debtor" (19o) he is to "sovereign free grace" (19o). 
Imaginary Dualism in the Storm Sequence 
While Equiano's conversion to Christianity obliterates his sense of obligation to 
King, this Christian "understanding" nonetheless acts retroactively in the text. 
Equiano's "enlightenment" by Biblical word follows a crisis of conscience that, in 
theory, should have been predicated on an understanding of the Bible. This failure 
in the chronological sequence of the conversion narrative makes the veiling of un- 
conscious textual drives by conscious discourse conspicuous. 
In fact, the crisis of conscience appears too early in the narrative precisely be- 
cause it is needed to fulfill the transfer of duty from Robert King to "God" first sug- 
gested in the manumission scene. Emerging gradually between the end of the 
seventh chapter and the beginning of the eighth (the last chapter of volume one 
and the first chapter of volume two in the original), the crisis is concurrent with 
Equiano's two voyages from Georgia to Montserrat and back requested by King af- 
ter the manumission scene. These voyages are distinguished by the great storms 
that attend them. In the first voyage, which Equiano calls his "free voyage" (142), 
the captain of the ship dies. But despite the "strong northerly gales and rough seas" 
(142) that cause the drowning of the ship's cargo of cattle, Equiano succeeds in pi- 
loting the ship to shore at Antigua and then to Montserrat. He reports that 
"[m]any were surprised when they heard of my conducting the sloop into the port, 
7 The lines repeated are Isaiah xxv.7. I am indebted to Caretta for highlighting Equiano's 
deployment of Biblical verse in his edition of the text. Caretta cites Acts iv.12 as follows: 
"Neither is there salvation in any other: for there is none other name under heaven given 
among men, whereby we must be saved." See Caretta's notes in Equiano 290. 
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and I now obtained a new appellation, and was called captain" (144). The epithet 
"captain" symbolizes not only his courage in saving the ship but also his newly ac- 
quired free status as captain of his own self. After this incident, Equiano remarks 
that he thought his "gratitude to Mr. King" (147) was "pretty well discharged in 
bringing back his vessel safe, and delivering his cargo to his satisfaction" (147). 
That is, the account of the first "free voyage" closes with the exoneration of Equi- 
ano and an expectation of his release from any further obligation towards King. 
The second "free voyage," which initially opened the second volume, is almost 
a repetition of the first, like a replay of the end of last week's episode in a serial tele- 
vision drama. The route taken by the ship is the same. Although, at first, the voyage 
is calm, when the new captain's carelessness causes the ship to be steered towards 
dangerous rocks, scenes of a stormy ocean are regenerated. Equiano's dialogue is- 
sues a warning of the disaster to come: "'The breakers,' said I, 'are around us, and 
the vessel is almost on the rock"' (149). Immediately, "the roaring of the billows" 
(149) and a "single heave of the swells" (149) causes the wreck of the ship. During 
this second disaster, Equiano again comports himself like a captain. He constructs 
a makeshift patch of the ship's damaged side, allowing it to stay afloat until the next 
morning. That day, while the white sailors on board get drunk, Equiano and four 
other men of color ("three black men and a Dutch Creole sailor"; 151) make five 
journeys from the ship to a nearby island in the lifeboat, thereby rescuing everyone 
on board. The account of the second "free voyage" begins with a renewed sense of 
Equiano's obligation to King but ends by acquitting him of such obligation for the 
second time. Indeed, after the second voyage, Equiano finally leaves King's service 
and embarks for England. The conversion narrative takes preeminence at this 
point. 
Most likely, the narrative of the two "free voyages" aimed to convince an eigh- 
teenth-century, white audience that Equiano had comported himself dutifully 
with respect to King; he shows how he strived to acquit himself of any legal or mor- 
al obligation. The account of two dreams, occurring between the two voyages, 
helps to reinforce this narrative function. Equiano reports, "I dreamt the ship was 
wrecked amidst the surfs and rocks, and that I was the means of saving every one 
of board; and on the night following I dreamed the very same dream" (148). By way 
of illustration, in the first two editions of the Life, an etching of a ship being tossed 
by a storm at sea entitled "Bahama Banks" (1767) formed a frontispiece to Volume 
Two. A selection of Biblical quotations was also included with the etching, the first 
of which comes from Job and reads: "Thus God speaketh once, yea twice, yet man 
perceiveth it not. In a Dream, in a Vision of the Night, when deep sleep falleth 
upon Men in slumbrings upon the Bed; then he openeth the Ears of Men, and 
sealeth their instruction" (144). Through the incorporation of these Biblical verses 
into his text, Equiano appears to suggest that his two dreams were messages from 
a God who speaks twice in dreams but is ignored. 
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But it is also feasible to read the two dreams as a Lacanian "imaginary duality," 
a term that Barbara Johnson defines in the following way: "It is characterized by its 
absoluteness, its independence from any accident or contingency that might sub- 
vert the unity of the terms in question, whether in their opposition or in their fu- 
sion" ("Frame" 119). Equiano's second dream exactly repeats the first; they are 
joined in a metaphoric rather than metonymic relation. They form what Johnson 
might call "a Bi-Part Soul" (121), the paradox of two halves of the same whole, each 
whole in itself, each a replica of the other and of the whole. Such a union can only 
be countenanced in language, for example, in the repetition of a word. The concept 
of an imaginary duality, the bi-part soul, forms the Lacanian structure of subjecti- 
fication. For Lacan, the identification of the pre-linguisticated "self" with the im- 
age of the other gives rise to a third element, the subject, the fantasy of self- 
presence. 
When Equiano pays no attention to the bi-part prophecy of the doubled dream, 
he is struck by his first intense crisis of conscience. His imaginary sense of "self" 
typified by the epithet "captain" is profoundly disturbed. An oath he utters on deck 
one evening-"Damn the vessel's bottom out" (148)-appears to be the direct 
cause of the crisis. But when he leaves his duty on deck that same evening and goes 
to sleep, the dream recurs for a third time. This time the dream seems to approxi- 
mate the status of "full speech." On a historical register, the events it prophesizes 
come about-the ship is wrecked and Equiano is primarily responsible for rescu- 
ing all the people on board. On a metaphysical register, Equiano finally hears the 
full-speaking god and acquits himself of the "sin" of his oath by coordinating the 
rescue. 
The sequence of events-storm, dream of storm, dream of storm, storm- 
forms a mirroring structure. The third and "full-speaking" dream seems to con- 
dense the sequence into one representation, one storm perhaps also rendered pic- 
torially in the "Bahama Banks" etching.8 Equiano becomes a savior fulfilling the 
bi-part and yet singular prophecy of the dream. At the end of the sequence, he re- 
marks, "My dream now returned upon my mind with all its force; it was fulfilled 
in every part; for our danger was the same I had dreamt of; and I could not help 
looking on myself as the principal instrument in effecting our deliverance[...]" 
(151). The language of the dream takes priority over the earlier words of Robert 
King which were only "like a voice from heaven" to Equiano. Instead, the dream's 
8 It is perhaps worth noting that in the third edition of the narrative published as one larger 
volume, the position of the etching was moved to before chapter seven, possibly corrob- 
orating my argument that the two chapters form a unit-a centerpiece within the con- 
scious discourse of the narrative. In later single-volume editions published during 
Equiano's lifetime, the etching was moved back to its original place between chapters sev- 
en and eight. See Carreta's note 403 in Equiano 279. 
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fulfillment has the effect of an incursion of imaginary language into the symbolic 
order, something like the mythical enactment of the "full speech" of a Christian de- 
ity, a god's voice sounding from the heavens above. It is viable to read the "Bahama 
Banks" etching as a representation of several kinds of imaginary dualism-two 
storms are combined into one, two dreams are combined into a single, full-speak- 
ing dream and event are amalgamated, and perhaps, also, image and text coalesce. 
Within this imaginary mode of reading, a union between a narrating self and a 
narrated self, between self-as-subject and self-as-object, or between self and other, 
is countenanced. The storm sequence seems almost to suspend the linear time of 
the narrative. The mirroring action of storms and dreams in Equiano's autobiog- 
raphy coincides with the structuring principles of subjectivity as Lacan presents 
them. An imaginary identification of textual and authorial subjectivity is suggest- 
ed. 
Digression and Difference in the Storm Sequence 
Even so, the aesthetic symmetry of the text's conscious discourse is disrupted by a 
digression during the second voyage. It begins after the ship has hit the rocks and 
Equiano suffers a vision of horror: "In a moment a scene of horror presented itself 
to my mind such as I never had conceived or experienced before. All my sins stared 
me in the face; and especially I thought that God had hurled his direful vengeance 
on my guilty head for cursing the vessel on which my life depended" (149). Equi- 
ano rationalizes his experience of horror as an effect of conscience triggered by his 
earlier misguided oath. But, since this crisis of conscience is premature, the "scene 
of horror" seems more closely connected to the realities of slavery in which he is 
imbricated. The experience of horror emotively foregrounds the horrific events 
that follow the shipwreck on the rocks-when the undependable captain recogniz- 
es the damage caused to the ship, he gives an order to "nail down the hatches" 
(149), in this way trapping the "cargo" of enslaved people on board and freeing up 
the lifeboat for the crew. Equiano's response to the captain's order is significant be- 
cause of its conflation of slavery and what he presents as his "sin." 
When he desired the men to nail down the hatches Ithought that my sin was the 
cause of this, and that God would charge me with these people's blood. This 
thought rushed upon my mind that instant with such violence, that it quite over- 
powered me, and I fainted. Irecovered just as the people were about to nail down 
the hatches; perceiving which, I desired them to stop. (149; emphasis added) 
If, due to a lack of "understanding," the narrated Equiano at this point in the au- 
tobiography could not have been overwhelmed by a sense of "sin" it seems more 
likely that conflicting identifications of self-as-subject and self-as-slave-object, 
produced by the captain's order effectively to drown the slaves, causes Equiano's 
traumatic response, his loss of consciousness. The self narrated by Equiano is not 
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"full-speaking" but intersubjective, attached to the slaves below deck as well as to 
the merchant-sailors above. 
In fact, the fainting recalls an earlier loss of consciousness when Equiano is first 
brought on board a European slave ship. During his account of his arrival at the 
ship, Equiano first uses the word "black" in relation to other people: 
When I looked around the ship too, and saw a large furnace of copper boiling, and 
a multitude of black people of every description chained together, every one of 
their countenances expressing dejection and sorrow, I no longer doubted of my 
fate, and, quite overpowered with horror and anguish, I fell motionless on the 
deck and fainted. (55; emphasis added) 
The connection between Equiano's experiences of horror and slavery are more ex- 
plicit in this early passage. The language demonstrates his recognition of the En- 
lightenment configuration of "blackness" as "absence."9 At the time of his enslave- 
ment, Equiano's slaveholders attempt to evacuate his body of his self. As a black 
self, he is figuratively pushed out of the symbolic order; he is "de-subjectivated," 
configured as non-subject, as object, or as absence. The suspension of the narra- 
tor's metonymic movement within the symbolic order produces a hiatus in the 
conscious discourse of the text. Equiano falls unconscious. As a character in his 
own text, he returns to a state of psychic chaos that precedes subjectivation. While 
the conscious discourse of the text works to "resubjectivate" Equiano, the loss of 
consciousness in the second "free" voyage represents a return of the repressed ex- 
perience of enslavement as objectification.'0 
The moment marked by the loss of consciousness acts like a flashback. It pro- 
duces a syncopated pattern of doubling that breaks the interlocking pairs of storms 
and dreams, fracturing the imaginary dualism of the storm sequence. By evoking 
the reader's memory of his past life as a slave, Equiano's second loss of conscious- 
ness re-introduces the temporality of the subject into the narrative. The metaphor- 
9 Henry Louis Gates has carefully examined what he names "the trope of the talking book" 
in the genre of slave narrative to show how black authors skillfully restructure their rela- 
tionship to the European reading of "blackness" asabsence. See Gates 127-69, especially 
136-37. 
10 In Lacanian theory, the subject's entry into the symbolic order initiates a movement along 
a chain of signifying objects that act as substitutes for the imaginary plenitude of the pre- 
linguisticated self. This is Lacan's revision of the Oedipus complex. Equiano's language 
here describes a failure of the Oedipus complex, or of the process of subjectivation. His 
identification with an imaginary other is divided and devastated, inducing trauma. For 
Lacan, the ultimate object of desire is death; it is the dumb and regulating reality that, 
Lacan says, "one is supposed to find again" (Ethics 52). Equiano's loss of consciousness 
may represent a physical manifestation of the death-drive, a repressed desire for imagi- 
nary plenitude of death. The loss of consciousness induces a death-like state. 
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ical mirroring of the two dreams and two storms are rendered as "misrecognition" 
and the tertiary quality, or difference, of the "full-speaking" dream begins to un- 
fold. If Equiano does, in fact, save the lives of everyone on board including the 
slaves, as the dream predicts, he does not save the slaves from slavery. 
Storm as an Iconography of Trauma 
Abolitionist rhetoric often equates deliverance from sin with deliverance from sla- 
very or Christian salvation with the slave's acquisition of freedom. Equiano's auto- 
biography conforms to this rhetorical convention. For example, during the con- 
version scene, he remarks that "[t]he worth of a soul cannot be told" (191). Here, 
the salvation of a soul is configured as an event that undermines the principle of 
exchange governing the slave's existence. However, the slaveholder's apparent will- 
ingness to condemn his slave to eternal damnation belies a state of "sinfulness" or, 
at the very least, a lack of "understanding." From Equiano's "enlightened" perspec- 
tive, the supporters of slavery, those who arguably constitute the most critical sec- 
tion of Equiano's targeted audience, are not distinguishable from their slaves who 
are also supposed to lack "understanding." If Equiano's conversion makes him 
"willing to be saved," then his cooperation with slavers during the second "free" 
voyage puts him in the untenable position of condemning other souls to damna- 
tion, perhaps, another likely reason for the premature emergence of the discourse 
of sin. The digression disarticulates the horrors of slavery and horror as a vision of 
sin. In doing so, it represses the constitutive paradox of the text's conscious dis- 
course of Enlightenment. But the puzzle contained in the digression also generates 
unconscious discursive effects or "surplus meaning" that dismantle the conscious 
or overt claims of the autobiography. 
During the conversion narrative, Equiano's crisis of conscience is typically in- 
tensified when slavery and freedom become textually snarled. For example, the 
second incursion of conscience into the narrative occurs abruptly, mid-paragraph, 
directly following the account of the kidnapping in London and enslavement of 
John Amis. Equiano reports that, while he was trying to negotiate Amis's release, 
he was "under strong convictions of sin" (181) and his mind was "unaccountably 
disturbed" (181). Here and throughout the autobiography, the lived frailty of "free" 
black status compounds the discursive aporia of "enlightened" blackness. Certain- 
ly, Equiano's complaints are unyielding as he recounts the injuries committed by 
whites against freemen and the inadequacy of the law to prevent them: 
Hitherto I had thought only slavery dreadful; but the state of a free Negro ap- 
peared to me now equally so at least, and in some respects even worse, for they 
live in constant alarm for their liberty, which is but nominal, for they are univer- 
sally insulted and plundered without the possibility of redress;[... ] (122) 
Events like John Amis's kidnapping highlight the shortcomings of the legal con- 
tract of manumission. As a legal process, manumission does not suspend the En- 
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lightenment reading of black skin as absence, or of black bodies as objects. This 
problem continues to destabilize the autonomy accorded to freed slaves in print. 
Elizabeth Jane Wall Hinds observes that Equiano's freedom must have been chal- 
lenged frequently to warrant the replication of the contract of manumission in his 
autobiography. She states "As a consciousness, Equiano is legally a universal equiv- 
alent to other legal citizens; as a body, however, his skin announcing his standing 
in all circumstances, the juridical self runs into the closed door of statutary law" 
(643). Equiano's inability to abrogate the threat to himself and others posed by the 
European trade in slaves, indeed his apparent need at times to co-operate with 
slavers in order to preserve his freed status, obstructs his articulation of a free self. 
At the end of the storm sequence, Equiano poignantly encapsulates this para- 
dox in an apostrophe. Within the conscious discourse of the text, the apostrophe 
performs a rite of departure, symbolically marking the end of his life as a slave: 
With a light heart I bade Montserrat farewell, and never had my feet on it since: 
and with it I bade adieu to the sound of the cruel whip and all other dreadful in- 
struments of torture! adieu to the offensive sight of the violated chastity of the sa- 
ble females, which has too often accosted my eyes! adieu to oppressions (although 
to me less severe than to most of my countrymen!) and adieu to the angry howl- 
ing dashing surfs! (164) 
During her discussion of the lyrical apostrophe, Johnson (1987) states that the male 
European tradition operates according to a formulaic convention: "I will animate 
you so that you will animate or re-animate me" (188). For the overt purpose of 
Equiano's autobiography, this convention seems to apply. The entity addressed, 
the port town of Montserrat, becomes subject. The town is addressed as if it were 
a person, so that Equiano can bid it farewell, announcing his new status as freed- 
man. Henry Louis Gates has demonstrated how Equiano deftly narrates his first 
encounters with European objects, such as watches, portraits and books, in order 
to show his comprehension of Western commodity culture and of his own exist- 
ence as commodity-as the master's object to be availed of or discarded on a 
whim. Gates contends that, for the enslaved Equiano, commodities are endowed 
with subjectivity as a reflection of the master's subjectivity. For example, within the 
context of slavery, a watch speaks to the master telling him how to run his day but 
the watch never speaks to other "objects," including slaves." According to Gates, 
Equiano replicates this strategy for understanding commodities in the narrative of 
"his own movement from slave-object to author-subject" (157). Arguably, then, as 
author-subject, Equiano's apostrophe to Montserrat serves to display his mastery 
by endowing an object with subject status. 
1" See Gates 156-57. 
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Yet even as the apostrophe animates otherwise static objects, it also complicates 
the conventional function of the trope. Rather than just any subject, Montserrat is 
personified as Slavery-the agency responsible for the production of the self as 
slave-object and for the subsequent tortures inflicted on the body and mind. The 
author's relationship to the entity animated by the figure cannot, therefore, be de- 
fined in simple terms. The town represents both an object and an experience, in- 
deed, a life, a former self from whom he now takes his leave. So Equiano's 
apostrophe delivers effects that are entirely different from those of the male Euro- 
pean tradition when his freed self is obliged to produce the end of his slave self and, 
while doing so, to animate objects used to objectify the slave-the whip and other 
grotesque instruments of torture. As the dynamics of lyrical address become 
messy, the distinction between subject and object, between animate speaker and 
inanimate language becomes undecidable. It is unclear who animates what or 
where the agency of the text lies. Does Equiano as author-subject, animate or an- 
nihilate his former self as slave-object? Or does the slave(-object or-subject is un- 
decided) animate the author-subject? 
As Equiano's apostrophe closes, the focus shifts from the institution of slavery 
to the stormy seas of the Carribean, a more conventional because apparently "nat- 
ural" entity-"adieu to the angry howling dashing surfs." Perhaps, it's not surpris- 
ing that the figure leans towards the male European tradition at the end since the 
conscious discourse of the "enlightened" black subject depends upon the restora- 
tion of that tradition. Even so, Equiano's last "adieu" resonates with nuances of the 
preceding ones. Since the stormy seas of the middle passage formed a context of 
Equiano's enslavement, even images of nature are implicated in the representation 
of the slave as object. In Equiano's apostrophe, it becomes impossible to separate 
things from the environment, people from things, objectivity from subjectivity. 
Storm erupts as an icon of the absence of the subject, an icon of trauma. In the ac- 
count of Equiano's two free voyages, an iconography of trauma is coincident with 
Equiano's elaboration of self. As Equiano negotiates a personal and collective his- 
tory of terror against which legal freedoms take shape, his status as subject be- 
comes indeterminate. Traumatic repressions accompanying the production of 
legal freedoms are inscribed in his writing. 
Conclusion 
This is not to say either that the unconscious discourse of trauma supersedes con- 
scious discourse in the text, or vice versa. Instead, both discourses function simul- 
taneously in the narrative, concealing and revealing opposing social and psychic 
exigencies of textual subjectivity. As Tate points out, it is important to distinguish 
textual subjectivity from textual meaning. For her, textual meaning is "an intersub- 
jective product of the text and the reader" while textual subjectivity is instead "de- 
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pendent entirely on the language that constitutes the text" (25). In order to con- 
struct textual meaning, the reader must engage in the process of interpretation. 
Equiano's autobiography retains historical value as a literary artifact of the ab- 
olition movement. But striking ambiguities continue to prohibit interpretation 
and to cast doubt on the conscious psychic processes of the narrating subject. The 
critical doubt generated by these ambiguities is in part what makes the text call for 
a psychoanalytic reading. Barbara Johnson states that "[p]sychoanalysis is not the 
interpretation of repetition; it is the repetition of a trauma of interpretation [...] 
the traumatic deferred interpretation not of an event, but as an event that never 
took place as such" (142). The Life of Olaudah Equiano literalizes the trauma of the 
interpolation of the modern black subject into the symbolic order as an event that 
never took place. 
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